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Abstract 
A growing number of authors have argued that humans automatically compute the 
mental state of other individuals. For instance, in the dot perspective task, observers 
are faster to judge the number of dots in a display when a human avatar has the same 
perspective as the observer compared to when their perspectives are different. This 
finding has been interpreted as evidence for ‘spontaneous perspective taking’. The 
present examined this claim using a variant of the dot perspective paradigm in which 
we manipulated what the avatar could see via physical barriers that either allowed the 
targets to be seen by the avatar or occluded this view. We found a robust ‘perspective 
taking’ effect despite the avatar being unable to see the same stimuli as the 
participant. These findings do not support the notion that humans spontaneously take 
the perspective of others.  
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Introduction 
           As humans, we often make conscious judgments concerning the mental state of 
other individuals in social situations. This occurs, for instance, when one wonders 
why a person is gazing at a particular location. Furthermore, the computation of other 
people’s perspective is central to efficient social cognition. A number of authors have 
argued that certain types of ‘Theory of Mind’ processes can occur automatically such 
that they are fast and do not require controlled processing. The most notable example 
was reported by Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Scott (2010), who 
argued that humans rapidly and spontaneously compute the perspective of other 
individuals. They employed a paradigm that has become known as the dot perspective 
task, in which observers are presented with a human avatar (located in the centre of a 
virtual room) that looks either towards a left or right-hand wall. A number of discs are 
positioned on the two lateral walls and the participant is asked to judge the number of 
discs from either their own perspective or the avatar’s perspective. The central 
manipulation concerns the consistency of the avatar’s and participant’s perspective; 
on some trials the avatar and participant can see the same number of discs whilst on 
other trials they see a different number. For example, if the avatar looks to the right-
hand wall and one disc is located on each of the two walls, the avatar sees one disc 
and the participant, by virtue of being able to see the whole room, sees two. By 
contrast, if two discs appear on the right-hand wall and none on the left, both the 
participant and the avatar see the same number of discs (i.e., two). Samson et al. 
found that reaction time (RT) to make the disc number judgment was shorter when the 
viewpoint of the avatar was consistent with the participant’s relative to when their 
viewpoints were inconsistent. The authors concluded that this consistency effect 
occurs because the computation of another person’s perspective occurs spontaneously. 
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In effect, the observer is said to compute what the avatar can see, and this 
representation includes the number of discs that can be seen. The knowledge about 
what the avatar sees then interferes with the observers’ knowledge about the total 
number of discs present, thus increasing RT when the two are inconsistent.  
        The spontaneous visual perspective taking notion has not however gone 
unchallenged. For instance, Santiesteban, Catmur, Coughlan Hopkins, Bird, and 
Heyes (2014) argued that the avatars employed in the Samson et al. experiments act 
as a cue that shifts attention to one side of the display. Indeed, the basic spontaneous 
perspective taking method is similar to the classic central cueing paradigm (Langton 
& Bruce, 1998) in which a cue, for instance a human face, is located in the centre of a 
display and looks towards the left or right hand side. Furthermore, the critical 
comparison of the Samson et al. method, i.e., ‘consistency-inconsistent’ (of the 
avatar’s and participant’s viewpoint), maps directly onto the critical comparison in the 
central cueing paradigm, i.e., ‘cued-uncued’. Although Samson et al. do include 
attentional cueing as a process that contributes to spontaneous perspective taking, a 
cueing effect could solely explain the basic effect. In support of their directional 
cueing hypothesis, Santiesteban et al. showed that a stimulus known to shift attention 
laterally (i.e., a centrally located arrow) induced consistency effects of comparable 
size to that of an avatar. 
         A problem however with the cueing hypothesis is that the perspective and 
cueing effects may operate independently but still generate a similar pattern of data. 
Thus, demonstrating that both arrows and avatars generate a consistency effect does 
not falsify the spontaneous perspective taking theory. As Firestone and Scholl (in 
press) have recently reminded us, “not only should you observe an effect when your 
theory calls for it, but you should also not observe an effect when your theory 
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demands its absence”. The principal aim of the present work was to test the claim that 
perspective taking is indeed spontaneous, as argued by Samson et al. (2010), by 
setting up a scenario in which visual perspective taking should not occur.  As with the 
original experiment of Samson et al., participants were presented with an avatar 
located in the middle of a display that looked either towards a left of right hand wall. 
Importantly, the ability of the avatar to see the stimuli that generate the basic 
perspective taking effect was manipulated by the positioning of physical barriers 
either side of the avatar. On ‘non-seeing’ trials these barriers fully occluded stimuli 
presented to the left or right whilst, on ‘seeing’ trials the barriers included window-
like features allowing the stimuli to be seen by the avatar (see Figure 1
1
). The use of 
physical barriers to manipulate what an agent can see is common when assessing 
mentalising in non-human animals (e.g., Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001). Clearly, if  
 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in the Experiment. The example shows a trial in which the 
avatar’s view is inconsistent with that of the participant. We as the viewer can see the 
two discs but the avatar can only see one. The example also shows barriers in the 
‘seeing’ condition; the avatar can see one of the walls. In ‘non-seeing’ trials the 
‘windows’ of the barriers are closed. 
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the avatar’s perspective is spontaneously taken, no Samson et al.-like effect should 
occur when the avatar is unable to see the inducing stimuli.  
Method. 
Participants. There were 24 participants who took part in exchange for course credit.  
Stimuli and apparatus. The virtual room was 19.6° wide and 12° high. A male or 
female human avatar (7.8° in height) was located in the centre and always faced to the 
left or right-hand wall. Barriers were located to the left and right of the avatar and were 
approximately the same height as the room and were 1.8° wide. The barriers were solid 
on half the trials and thus prevented the avatar from seeing the wall being faced. On the 
remaining trials the barriers had a section cut out, allowing the wall to be visible. On 
the left and right-hand walls were a number of red discs (0, 1, 2, or 3) measuring 
approximately .7° in height. On 50% of trials, the avatar faced towards the same 
number of discs that the participant could see, whilst on the remaining trials the avatar 
faced towards a different number of discs. This manipulation is the same as Samson et 
al.’s (2010) ‘consistent’-‘inconsistent’ manipulation. However, note that when the 
barriers occluded the avatar’s lateral view, the participant’s view was of course never 
consistent with the avatar’s. We therefore consider this as manipulating whether the 
avatar faced towards the same or different number of discs as that of the participant. 
The room and barriers together with a black fixation cross were present as background 
throughout the entire experiment. As with Samson et al., male observers were presented 
with a male avatar and female observers were presented with a female avatar. The 
experiment was run on an Apple eMac computer linked to a CRT monitor. 
Design and procedure. A within-participant, 2 x 2 factorial design was employed. The 
first factor manipulated whether the avatar faced towards the same number of discs that 
the participant could see or faced towards a different number (‘same’ vs ‘different’). 
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The second factor manipulated the avatar’s vision of the room’s left and right hand 
walls (‘seeing’ vs ‘non-seeing’). Each trial began with the presentation of a number 
(‘1’, ‘2’, or ‘3’) located in the centre of the display for 750 ms. This informed the 
participant of the disc number in the display that needed to be verified on the current 
trial. For instance, when the number ‘2’ appeared, this informed the participant that 
they will need to decide as quickly as possible whether two discs are present in the 
display. This number either matched the number of discs presented in that trial or did 
not match. This number disappeared for 500 ms after which the avatar and discs 
appeared until the participant responded. The beginning of a trial was initiated by the 
participant’s response on the previous trial. The participant was asked to press a left-
hand button if the disc number matched the number shown at the beginning of the trial 
or a right-hand button if they did not match. Observers were seated approximately 70 
cms from the display and asked to respond as quickly as possible whilst keeping errors 
to a minimum. The visibility condition was blocked. Blocking this factor meant that 
attribution of what the barriers allowed the avatar to see did not need to occur trial-by-
trial. At the beginning of each block, participants were shown an example of the 
relevant barrier and explicitly told that the avatar could either see or not see the two 
walls depending on which barrier/block was presented. There were 288 trials in total, 
144 of which were match trials and 144 non-match trials. Half of the trials were ‘same’ 
and half were ‘different’. For both matching and non-matching  trials, there were 48 
trials in which one disc was present, 48 trials in which two discs were present, and 48 
trials in which three discs were present. We did not include what Samson et al. called 
‘filler’ trials in which no discs were presented. Otherwise, our method closely replicates 
the aspects of Samson et al. critical to generating a spontaneous perspective taking 
effect. Twenty-four practice trials were given. Apart from the visibility condition which 
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was blocked, and presentation order counterbalanced, all trial types were presented in a 
random order.  
Check for the validity of our visibility manipulation. 
Because our experiments were concerned with the central claim of Samson et al., i.e., 
rapid computation of what others see, we did not include trials used by Samson et al. in 
which participants were asked to take the perspective of the avatar. Indeed, 
spontaneous computation of others’ perspective should not require observers to 
occasionally assume this perspective. This was alluded to recently by Schurz, 
Kronbichler, Weissengruber, Surtees, Samson, and Perner (2015) who argued that 
separating (i.e., ‘blocking’) trials in which participants are required to take their own 
perspective from trials in which they are required to take the avatar’s perspective is 
more likely to index spontaneous perspective taking. Indeed, presenting both trial types 
within one block is likely to induce participants to explicitly (i.e., non-spontaneously) 
consider the avatar’s perspective precisely because perspective taking is part of the 
task. Thus, in addition to our formal experiment we also ran a test to determine whether 
our visibility manipulation was effective. Five participants who did not take part in the 
main experiment were presented with 12 examples of the type of display shown in 
Figure 1. On six of these examples the window-like structures were open whilst on the 
other six they were closed. Participants were asked to take the perspective of the avatar 
and judge how many dots the avatar could see. All five participants were 100% correct. 
Thus, for instance, when the windows were closed all stated that the avatar could not 
see any dots. 
Results 
Three participant’s data were excluded from further analysis due to an error rate of 
more than 20%. Our primary analysis was on RT; that is, the interval between 
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avatar/dot onset and response. In line with Samson et al. (2010), only the matching 
trials were analysed. 4.2% of responses were outliers, defined as lying outside two 
standard deviations (SD) for each participant’s condition mean, and omitted from 
further analysis. Figure 2 shows mean RTs for each of the four conditions. An 
ANOVA with number of discs faced with respect to the participant (same, different) 
and visibility (seeing or non-seeing) as within-participants factors revealed a 
significant main effect of discs faced, F(1, 20) = 12.7, p < 0.002, = .39, but no 
significant main effect of visibility, F(1, 20) < 1. The interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 20) < 1. We also analysed the error data using the same factors and levels 
described above. There was a small but non-significant main effect of discs faced, 
F(1, 20) = 3.9, p < 0.06, = .2, and no significant main effect of visibility, F(1, 20) < 
1. The interaction was also non-significant, F(1, 20) < 1.  
 
Figure 2. Mean RT and error rates together with standard errors.  
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Discussion 
           The present work examined whether observers spontaneously compute the 
perspective of other individuals, as reported by Samson et al. (2012). In addition to 
the standard dot perspective condition, we employed stimuli in which the avatar could 
not see any targets and thus never had the same perspective as the observer. As 
Samson et al. reported, we found that observers were relatively slow to make a 
perceptual judgement when their view of the critical stimuli was inconsistent with the 
view of another individual (i.e., an avatar) in the display. By contrast, RTs were 
relatively short when their view and the avatar’s view were consistent. On their own, 
these data support the perspective taking account. Furthermore, the size of this effect 
is comparable to that reported previously (i.e., ~40 ms). However, data from trials in 
which the avatar could not see any of the two lateral walls, and hence never saw the 
same number of discs as the participant, also showed the same pattern of data. This 
suggests that the effect reported by Samson et al. cannot be due to the participant 
taking the avatar’s perspective since no consistency effect should have occurred 
under this condition. This in turn challenges the spontaneous perspective taking 
account. 
          One particular advantage of the present study is that we have provided a very 
direct test of a spontaneous mental attribution theory. As we suggested in the 
Introduction, we have set up an experiment in which the spontaneous perspective 
taking theory can be falsified. These data are also consistent with our previous 
observation that changes in perspective do not modulate the gaze-cueing effect (Cole, 
Smith, & Atkinson, 2015). The results of our direct tests contrast with many previous 
studies that have indirectly assessed spontaneous ToM processes. This is particularly 
the case for neuroimaging studies. fMRI work suggest that the medial prefrontal 
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cortex (mPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) are predominantly involved 
in social inferences of others, that is, thoughts, goals and intentions (e.g., Van 
Overwalle, 2009; Frith & Frith, 1999). Whilst measuring blood flow from a number 
of brain areas including the mPFC, Calder et al. (2002) presented observers with 
photographs of people whose eyes gazed at various positions. Participants were asked 
to indicate whether the models had thick or thin eyebrows. Importantly, observers 
were not asked to consider the mental state of the models; they were only asked to 
make a simple perceptual judgment. Results showed that direct gaze was particularly 
associated with activity in the fusiform gyrus. This can be expected given this 
region’s well known involvement in face processing (Cole, Heywood, Kentridge, 
Fairholm, & Cowey, 2003; Kanwisher, Mcdermott, & Chun, 1997). More 
importantly however, was the observation that averted gaze lead to greater activity in 
the mPFC cortex. In other words, activity in a brain region associated with ToM was 
automatically activated when a person observed gaze behaviour. Although Calder et 
al. did suggest the possibility that participants may have attended to the models’ gaze 
in order to explicitly consider their mental state, the authors did conclude that this 
inference was made automatically. Similarly, Schurz et al. (2015) have recently 
reported that participants undertaking the specific perspective taking paradigm of 
Samson et al. (2010) show pronounced activity in the mPFC and (right) TPJ. As with 
Calder et al. the authors argued that these result suggest spontaneous perspective 
taking. However, our current data suggest that this correlation between activity in 
certain brain areas and gaze direction cannot be taken as strong evidence for the 
automatic computation of perspective. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly 
given the attention cueing explanation of the basic Samson et al. effect (Santiesteban 
et al. 2014), the TPJ has also been implicated in  attention reorientation as well as 
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self–other distinction (see Decety & Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008).  
         Although the question is beyond the aims and scope of the present work (i.e., we 
have refuted the perspective taking claim rather than supported it), one outstanding 
question is why the consistency effect occurs at all. In addition to the cueing 
hypothesis (Santiesteban et al. 2014), another possibility concerns the critical stimuli 
(i.e., the dots) and their role as task relevant items. Perhaps observers do take on the 
perspective of the avatar, but this perspective only sees information relevant to the 
observer’s task; it may be blind with respect to all other stimuli, including barriers. 
Samson et al. (2010) argued for the ‘spontaneous’ aspect of their account based on the 
fact that the avatar’s perspective was task irrelevant. However, an abundance of work 
on attentional control settings in visual cognition has shown that such relevancy can 
operate in extremely subtle ways (Folk, Remington, & Jonhston, 1992). In the present 
context, having a strong top-down attentional set for discs could have resulted in 
participants assuming the avatar’s perspective with respect to these stimuli. This set 
would then receive sensory reinforcement on every trial as participants made saccades 
to the dots but rarely, if ever, to the barriers. Although the authors were primarily 
concerned with evolutionary relevant stimuli, data from one previous spontaneous 
perspective taking study may provide support for the task relevancy hypothesis. 
Zwickel and Muller (2010) asked observers to rapidly localize a dot from either their 
own perspective or that of a face presented in the centre of the display. Results 
showed that RTs were slower when the adopted perspective and the observer’s 
perspective conflicted. Importantly however was the observation that this only 
occurred when the agent exhibited a fearful expression. As with many other 
evolutionary important stimuli (e.g., venomous animals; see Cole & Wilkins, 2013), 
this type of emotive face is often considered as being of general relevancy. 
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Furthermore, task relevancy may account for why primates are sensitive to opaque 
barriers in visual perspective taking tasks but adults in the dot perspective task are 
not. In these studies, a subordinate animal will modify its behaviour based upon 
whether a dominant animal can see a mutual food reward. Again, the presence of 
evolutionarily relevant stimuli in the form of a more dominant agent may heighten the 
sensitivity of the subordinate ape to sources of occlusion in another’s perspective 
(Hare, et al., 2001).  
            To summarize, the current study examined the claim that perspective taking 
occurs spontaneously. Contrary to this claim we observed a robust ‘perspective taking 
effect’ even when the perspective of the avatar was different to that of the observer. 
These results are not consistent with the claim that humans spontaneously compute 
perspective. It is worth noting that we do not argue that the dot perspective task does 
not involve any social processing mechanisms, only those concerned with 
spontaneous perspective taking. This is based on recent evidence by Nielsen, Slade, 
Levy, and Holmes (2015) who showed that the degree of spontaneous perspective 
taking positively correlates with self-reported empathy.  Finally, future workers may 
want to consider employing the occluding barrier technique when using other 
paradigms suggestive of spontaneous perspective taking. 
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                                                    Footnotes 
1). We are extremely grateful to Dana Samson for providing us with all her stimulus 
images, even though we only requested one example as a template to generate our 
own.  
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